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ab initio the ascription to this concept of an ultimate ontological status, so that it becomes the criterion, at once external and absolute, of reality, with which the actual or real world is then to be compared and valued, and from which it is regarded as produced by some mysterious operation of the mind. It would be as reasonable to multiply the figure representing the national debt by $\sqrt{-1}$ and then regard the imaginary result as the true basis of the country's financial stability.

J. E. TURNER.

LIVERPOOL, ENGLAND.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy. C. A. RICHARDSON.

Cambridge: University Press. 1919. Pp. xxi + 335.

In this volume we find anew, in the setting of recent philosophy, the central theses of Leibnitz's monadology: the unity, substantiality and eternity of the subject (monad); the identity of causality and activity; the interpretation of matter as the "appearance" of monads; the theory of the relation of the mind to the body as the dominance of one monad in a society of other cooperating monads. Spiritual pluralism is, however, not regarded by Mr. Richardson as a demonstrable, but as a most highly probable, doctrine. In his opinion, its probability has been increased, not diminished, by the contributions of such recent philosophers as Bertrand Russell and the new-realists in America; and to prove this is, I take it, the chief aim of his book. Unlike James Ward in *The Realm of Ends*, the author does not seek to present a developed picture of a pluralistic universe, but to solve certain special problems and to remove prominent misunderstandings.

In the first chapter, entitled "Scientific Method in Philosophy and the Foundations of Pluralism," it is argued that Russell's so-called "scientific method" has strengthened spiritualism by showing that matter can be reduced without remainder to constructions of sense data. It might have been added that pragmatism has shown the motive to these constructions. And against all forms of materialism and realism, spiritualism maintains its advantages: (1) of recognizing the subject of experience; (2) of explaining the world, that is, of interpreting it in terms of experience itself, instead of merely describing it in terms of abstract concepts; (3) of working with a single principle. The failure to recognize the subject of experience remains, according to the author, the great vice of the new-realism. For the existence of the self is indubitable: we can not know it "by acquaintance," but from such facts as knowing and

feeling we can infer its existence immediately; and, on the basis of our inner realization of it, we can possess much knowledge of it "by description."

Chapter 2, on "Certain Criticisms of Pluralism," is chiefly a reply to Bosanquet's and Pringle-Pattison's objections.

In Chapter 3, "The Philosophical Problem raised by the Weber-Fechner Law," the author concludes that there is no evidence for the existence of unperceived sense data in the mind and still less for their existence outside the mind. To the argument for the independence of sense data on the ground that "physics can describe the object of experience and make verifiable predictions about it without reference to the subject or to perception," the author replies: "I can observe the positions and movements of the hands of my watch, and make true predictions as to their future positions, without any reference whatever to the mainspring. Yet the latter is the *sine qua non* of all that I have observed and inferred." The author's view is that the object of experience is the appearance of one subject to another subject and is under their double control. Thus, from this point of view, the sense datum stands in two relations: the relation of presentation to the one subject, and the relation of "being the appearance of" to the other subject.

In Chapter 4, "The Notion of a Deterministic System," the author, taking his start from Russell's essay "On the Notion of Cause," is concerned to discover whether the mind can belong to a deterministic system. The answer depends on whether or not quantitative notions are significant of mind. That they are not is the author's conclusion. Determinism applies, therefore, only to sense data, not to the subject to which they are given.

Chapter 5, "The Intensity of Sense Data," reminds one of Bergson's *Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*. The argument is that differences of intensity are not quantitative but qualitative, and that the possibility of applying quantitative terms here depends simply on the fact that sense data can be arranged as regards intensity in a certain order of qualitative similarity based on the movements of accommodation of attention.

Chapter 6, "Immortality," seeks not to answer the question, Do we live forever? but to clarify the problems involved in raising it. It is in this chapter more than elsewhere, I think, that one gets closest to the position of the author, and, I should say, most fully realizes its difficulties. For the strict monadist, there is only private time, no public time, and within the private experience, since the subject is an indivisible unity, temporal distinctions apply only to the object, and there, like all other distinctions, only approxi-

mately. The question, Do we live forever? becomes therefore meaningless, for we can not even think of a beginning or end of experience itself.

Chapter 7, "The Relation between Mind and Body," expounds the monadistic theory. For the individual experience, the body is just part of the *totum objectivum*; underlying it, however, are monads which stand in peculiarly intimate relations to the subject—through them it acts and perceives. The type of relation involved, which the author admits is not further describable, he calls immanence. Thus interpreted, the body acts as the "nurse" of the mind, bringing the mind into relation with its environment and thus mediating the development of personality. Mr. Richardson believes that death involves merely the severing of the tie between the dominant and the subordinate monads, not the extinction of the former. The body, like a tool necessary for the performance of certain work, but not absolutely indispensable, becomes eventually a hindrance rather than a help; and death, while it withdraws us from certain parts of our environment, sets free imagination, memory and intellect.

The last chapter, "Subconsciousness and Certain Abnormal Phenomena," is an effort to interpret abnormal and so-called "psychic" phenomena in terms of the monadistic thesis.

The problems raised in this book are so fundamental that a discussion of the author's hypotheses would require an extensive article. The book is written with great care and much subtlety. There is, however, a tendency to rely too much on arguments from concepts, without due inquiry into their meaning and source. Such for example is the argument for the existence of the self on page 20. In general, I think the book would gain cogency through a larger use of empirical material. One is, moreover, left somewhat "in the air" by the author's declaration that spiritual pluralism must be supplemented by some unifying principle. For where will that lead us?

DEWITT H. PARKER.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

Messiahs: Christian and Pagan. WILSON D. WALLIS. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1918. Pp. 276.

This book undertakes to show how widespread and frequent in the history of religions are the phenomena of messiahs and messianic movements. It is a useful collation of material from a wide range of sources—such as has not been made heretofore. In addition to the messianic movement in pre-christian Judaism the author gives